πCharter
Built By DAO is a Wyoming DAO LLC where contribution creates ownership, and ownership creates governance. This charter establishes the foundational rules for how the DAO operates.
Wyoming DAO LLC
Constitutional Governance
NFT-based Membership
Quadratic Voting
π― Core Principle: Contribution creates ownership. Ownership creates governance. Capital can fund, but labor governs.
π Immutable Foundation: Smart contracts enforce these rulesβthey cannot be overridden, even by consensus.
ποΈ Legal Entity
Built By DAO operates as a Wyoming DAO LLC under Wyoming DAO Supplement (W.S. 17-31).
Entity Type
Wyoming DAO LLC
Jurisdiction
Wyoming, USA
Formation
Under Wyoming DAO Supplement
Governance Integration
Smart contracts + Operating Agreement
Legal Powers
Can own property, sign contracts, hire, sue/be sued
The operating agreement designates smart contracts as the primary governance mechanism while maintaining legal compliance and member protections.
π― Mission & Purpose
Built By DAO builds community infrastructure and housing where contribution creates permanent ownership stake.
π Housing
Develop affordable, sustainable, member-owned housing
π€ Community
Create gathering spaces and infrastructure for shared purpose
βοΈ Equity
Distribute ownership through work and contribution, not capital
π± Sustainability
Build for generations, not extraction
π₯ Membership Model
Membership is NFT-based and non-transferable (soul-bound).
Membership
ERC-721 NFT representing membership status
Proof
Held in individual wallet, tied to one person
Rank System
14 levels (Seeker β Steward) + 3 special ranks
Acquisition
Earn through contribution or be invited as investor
Rights
Governance participation, property access, earning
π’ Governance Authority
The DAO exercises governance through three integrated mechanisms:
On-Chain Voting
All members
Day-to-day decisions, treasury, policy
Leadership Council
Elected senior leaders
Oversight, mission protection, veto
Smart Contracts
Immutable rules
Safety rails, quorum, thresholds
No mechanism can override the others. Governance is distributed and mutually constraining.
π₯ 14-Level Membership Ranks
Membership comprises 14 rank levels plus 3 special designations. Rank determines voting weight multiplier, proposal authority, and governance participation.
π± Entry Tier (Levels 1A-1B)
1A
π± Seeker
10
1.00Γ
Onboarding complete
1B
πΏ Apprentice
15
1.00Γ
2+ weeks active
Permissions:
View governance, earn EQTBLT, attend events
Cannot vote or submit proposals
π§ Contributor Level (Level 2)
2
π§ Contributor
20
1.02Γ
6+ weeks, active contribution
Permissions:
Vote on proposals
Submit small-scope proposals
Join working groups
βοΈ Individual Contributor Tier (Levels 3A-3B)
3A
βοΈ Operator
30
1.05Γ
Breadth & coordination
3B
π― Specialist
35
1.05Γ
Depth & expertise
Permissions:
Full governance participation
Submit mid-scope proposals in their lane
Mentor apprentices
π Leadership Tier (Levels 4-7)
4
π· Crew Lead
40
1.08Γ
3-4 person team
5
π Project Lead
50
1.10Γ
Multi-team coordination
6
π§ Guide
60
1.12Γ
Mentorship & culture
7
ποΈ Community Lead
70
1.15Γ
Division leadership
Permissions increase with level:
Level 4-5: Lead teams, sponsor mid-scope proposals
Level 6-7: Sponsor high-scope proposals, promote members
π Senior Tier (Levels 8-10)
8A
β Anchor
80
1.18Γ
Culture & cohesion
8B
π₯οΈ Platform Lead
82
1.18Γ
Systems & infrastructure
9A
π‘οΈ Guardian
90
1.22Γ
Ethics & standards
9B
π Strategist
91
1.22Γ
System-wide strategy
10
βοΈ Steward
92
1.25Γ
Unified stewardship
Permissions: Unrestricted governance participation, all proposal authority.
β Special Ranks
π Leadership Council
95
1.25Γ
Collective oversight body
πΌοΈ Framer
97
1.25Γ
Foundational recognition
β Founder
99
1.25Γ
Emergency backstop (time-limited)
π Rank Progression
Advancement is evidence-based, not automatic:
Entry β Contributor
Time + demonstrated commitment
Contributor β Individual
Performance review + mentor recommendation
Individual β Leadership
Leadership readiness assessment
Leadership β Senior
Strategic contribution + peer review
All promotions tracked on-chain. Advancement is permanent unless member is removed.
π³οΈ Voting Power Formula
Voting power determines influence on DAO decisions.
π’ Component 1: Base Power (Quadratic)
EQTBLT is the primary voting token. Voting power derives from quadratic formula:
100
1,000
100x efficiency
1,000
3,162
Diminishing returns prevent whale dominance
10,000
10,000
1x efficiency (ceiling approaches)
100,000
31,623
Still capped at 4Γ base
Purpose: Quadratic voting ensures 100 members with 100 EQTBLT each (10,000 total) have MORE collective power than 1 whale with 10,000. This prevents concentration.
ποΈ Component 2: Rank Multiplier
Your membership rank boosts voting power:
π± Seeker / πΏ Apprentice
1.00Γ
π§ Contributor
1.02Γ
βοΈ Operator / π― Specialist
1.05Γ
π· Crew Lead
1.08Γ
π Project Lead
1.10Γ
π§ Guide
1.12Γ
ποΈ Community Lead
1.15Γ
β Anchor / π₯οΈ Platform Lead
1.18Γ
π‘οΈ Guardian / π Strategist
1.22Γ
βοΈ Steward
1.25Γ
Justification: Rank reflects tenure, contribution, and demonstrated judgment. Higher ranks get modest multipliers (max +25%).
β° Component 3: Activity Multiplier
Recent participation boosts power:
Last 30 days
100% (1.25Γ multiplier)
31-90 days
70% (1.10Γ multiplier)
91-180 days
40% (1.00Γ multiplier)
>180 days inactive
20% (0.80Γ multiplier)
Purpose: Active members who stay informed have more say. Inactive holders' power decays.
π° Component 4: Investor Multiplier
Investor NFT holders receive governance multipliers on EQTBLT holdings only:
π Angel 1-5
$10k - $250k
1.5Γ - 3.0Γ
π VentureOne 1-4
$500k - $5M
3.5Γ - 4.5Γ
ποΈ Trust
$5M+
5.0Γ
Critical: Investor multipliers apply ONLY to EQTBLT. An investor with $5M but zero EQTBLT has zero voting power.
π Component 5: 4Γ Ceiling
No member can have more than 4Γ their base quadratic power, regardless of rank, activity, or investment.
Steward + High Activity + VentureOne Tier
100,000 = 31,623 base
Γ 1.25 Γ 1.25 Γ 4.5 = 222,539
126,492 (4Γ ceiling)
β Applies
Purpose: The ceiling prevents capital capture. Even the richest, highest-ranked, most active member cannot dominate by themselves.
π Eligibility to Vote & Propose
π³οΈ Vote
EQTBLT balance + Membership NFT
Weight determined by formula above
π Submit Proposal
Membership NFT + 2 BLTBY stake
Stake refunded regardless of outcome
π¬ Discuss
Any member can participate
No formal threshold
Investors Cannot Submit Proposals β only members can. Ensures governance remains contributor-driven.
π Proposal Submission
Any member can submit a proposal by staking 2 BLTBY.
π« Membership NFT
Must be active member
π 2 BLTBY Stake
Refunded after voting (pass or fail)
π Clear Specification
Title, description, implementation, resources
β° Discussion Window
3-7 days before formal submission
π Proposal Types & Thresholds
Proposals are categorized by impact. Higher impact requires higher consensus.
βοΈ Operational Proposals
Day-to-day decisions: process improvements, minor budget adjustments, working group actions.
β Approval Threshold
>50% of votes
π Quorum
10% of eligible voters
β±οΈ Voting Period
7 days
β° Timelock
48 hours before execution
Spending Limit: Max $10,000 per proposal.
π° Financial/Strategic Proposals
Significant resource decisions: budget approvals, partnerships, major projects, >$10K spending.
β Approval Threshold
>60% of votes
π Quorum
15% of eligible voters
β±οΈ Voting Period
7 days
β° Timelock
72 hours before execution
ποΈ Governance/Policy Proposals
Structural changes: governance rules, constitutional amendments, policy creation, smart contract upgrades, token mechanic changes.
β Approval Threshold
>65% of votes
π Quorum
20% of eligible voters
β±οΈ Voting Period
7 days
β° Timelock
7 days before execution
Additional Requirements:
2-week discussion period
Security audit (if contract upgrade)
Leadership Council review (if affects governance)
π Quorum & Approval
Approval Threshold
Quorum Requirement
π Proposal Lifecycle
1οΈβ£ Draft
N/A
Proposer prepares in community
2οΈβ£ Submission
Immediate
Stakes 2 BLTBY, goes on-chain
3οΈβ£ Voting
7 days
All members vote
4οΈβ£ Timelock
48-336 hours
Delay before execution
5οΈβ£ Execution
Automatic
Smart contract executes if passed
π« Proposal Limits
Prevents governance spam:
Active per proposer
Max 3 at once
Cooldown
7 days between submissions by same proposer
System-wide
Max 20 active proposals total
β
Voting Options
For
Counts toward approval threshold
Against
Counts against approval threshold
Abstain
Counts toward quorum, not approval
π° Treasury Management
The Treasury is Built By DAO's primary fund vault. All withdrawals require governance approval + compliance with immutable safety limits.
π‘οΈ Immutable Safety Rails
These limits are hardcoded into the smart contract and cannot be bypassed, even by consensus.
Per-Proposal Limit: 10%
Maximum withdrawal per proposal: 10% of treasury value
$1M
$100K
$10M
$1M
$100M
$10M
Purpose: Prevents a single malicious proposal from draining significant funds.
Daily Limit: 5%
Maximum total withdrawals per day: 5% of treasury value
$1M
$50K
$10M
$500K
$100M
$5M
Purpose: Limits extraction speed, giving community days to respond.
Monthly Limit: 20%
Maximum total withdrawals per month: 20% of treasury value
$1M
$200K
$10M
$2M
$100M
$20M
Purpose: Caps sustained withdrawal activity.
Reserve Floor: 15%
Minimum balance always retained: 15% of treasury value
$1M
$150K
$10M
$1.5M
$100M
$15M
Purpose: Ensures DAO always has emergency funds.
π° Withdrawal Process
Proposal Submission β Member submits withdrawal proposal with recipient, amount, justification
Voting β >60% approval required, 15% quorum
Timelock β 72-hour review window
Execution β Smart contract executes, safety rails verified
All withdrawals are:
β On-chain and verifiable
β Subject to all four safety rails
β Recorded in treasury reports
π Supported Assets
The Treasury can hold multiple asset types:
π΅ USDC
Base
6
π΅ USDT
Base
6
π΅ DAI
Base
18
π΅ PYUSD
Base
6
π BLTBY
Base
18
β ETH
Base
18
New assets can be added via governance proposal.
π Attack Protection Example
Imagine attacker gains 51% voting power and tries to drain treasury:
Without safety rails: Treasury would be emptied in one transaction.
ποΈ Leadership Council
The Leadership Council is a collective governance body providing oversight, mission protection, and emergency veto authority.
Members
3-7 elected senior leaders (Token ID 95)
Term
12 months (3 consecutive terms max)
Authority
Review, veto, emergency powers
Constraint
Cannot initiate actionsβonly block harmful ones
π₯ Eligibility & Election
Eligibility
To serve on Council, members must:
ποΈ Rank
Level 8+ (Anchor/Platform Lead or higher)
β° Tenure
12+ months active membership
π Track Record
Demonstrated governance participation
Election Process
Nomination
2 weeks
Members nominate 5+ endorsements from L5+)
Campaigning
2 weeks
Candidates present platforms
Voting
1 week
Ranked choice voting, all L2+ members
Installation
3 days
New Council begins term
π³οΈ Council Authority
Final Review
Council reviews high-impact proposals before execution:
π° Financial proposals >10% treasury
Automatic review
ποΈ Any governance/policy proposal
Automatic review
βοΈ Operational proposals
No review required
Timeline: 48-hour review window after proposal passes community vote.
Veto Power
Council can veto proposals that:
π― Mission Violation
Proposal contradicts DAO's housing mission
βοΈ Legal Risk
Creates serious legal liability
π Security Threat
Compromises system security
πΈ Financial Attack
Attempts treasury drain despite safety rails
π Hostile Takeover
Coordinated governance capture attempt
Requirements:
π₯ At least 2 Council members must agree
π Written rationale required
π Veto recorded on-chain
π’ Explanation published to community
Veto Timeline:
Must occur within 48 hours of proposal passing
Cannot veto during voting period
Cannot veto after execution begins
π Override Mechanism
The community can override a veto through supermajority vote:
Approval
75%+ of votes
Quorum
30% of eligible voters
Timeline
7-day deliberation, then 7-day voting
If override passes, proposal executes despite veto.
π’ Operations & Accountability
Council maintains regular operations:
Regular Meetings
Weekly
Minutes published within 48h
Review Sessions
As needed
Per-proposal documentation
Town Halls
Monthly
Open to all members
Quarterly Reports
Public
Performance and decisions
All decisions:
β Documented in writing
β Recorded on-chain
β Subject to appeal via governance vote
β Published to community
π¨ Emergency Powers
Council can take expedited action in true emergencies:
π Active Attack
Can pause treasury, veto malicious proposals immediately
π₯ Critical Bug
Can pause operations, freeze contracts
βοΈ Legal Emergency
Can take protective action
π₯ System Failure
Can invoke emergency procedures
Constraints:
Requires 2+ Council members
Must document reasoning within 24 hours
Subject to post-incident review
Can be overridden by 60%+ community vote
βοΈ Amending This Charter
This charter is the foundational law of Built By DAO. Amendments are possible but require the highest consensus.
ποΈ Constitutional Amendments
Changes to core governance structure (voting rules, quorum, rank system, safety rails) require:
π³οΈ Proposal Type
Governance/Policy (>65% approval)
π Quorum
30% of eligible voters (vs. normal 20%)
π¬ Discussion Period
2-week mandatory discussion
β° Timelock
14 days before execution
π₯ Council Review
Leadership Council review + non-veto confirmation
Definition: Constitutional changes include:
Voting formula modification
β
Rank system overhaul
β
Safety rail adjustment
β
Quorum/threshold changes
β
Removing Leader Council veto
β
π Policy Amendments
Regular policy changes (e.g., adding proposal types, adjusting operational limits) use standard governance:
π³οΈ Proposal Type
Governance/Policy (>65% approval)
π Quorum
20% of eligible voters (standard)
β° Timelock
7 days before execution
Definition: Policy changes include:
Adjusting spending caps
β Policy
Adding new proposal type
β Policy
Refining governance processes
β Policy
Updating operational rules
β Policy
π What Cannot Be Changed
Certain core principles are permanent, unamendable:
π― Mission
Housing + community, not profit extraction
π₯ Membership Democracy
One member, one voice (+ voting power formula)
π‘οΈ Safety Rails
Treasury limits cannot be bypassed
π 4Γ Power Ceiling
Prevents whale dominance
π EQTBLT as equity
Non-transferable, earned only
βοΈ Leadership Council
Provides external check
These principles are hardcoded in smart contracts to prevent even supermajority override.
π Amendment Process Steps
1οΈβ£ Propose
Proposer submits amendment with:
Clear statement of change
Rationale and justification
Impact analysis
Comparison to current rule
2οΈβ£ Discuss
Community deliberation period:
Forum discussion
Working group analysis
Public commentary
Council guidance (if constitutional)
3οΈβ£ Refine
Proposer may modify based on feedback:
Amendments permitted until voting begins
All changes documented
4οΈβ£ Vote
Standard governance voting applies:
Constitutional amendment: 65% + 30% quorum
Policy amendment: 65% + 20% quorum
7-14 day voting period
5οΈβ£ Implement
On-chain execution via smart contract:
Governance contract calls implementation
All contract state updated
Block-by-block verification
π Amendment History
All amendments are:
β Permanently recorded on-chain
β Documented with voting results
β Linked to original proposals
β Published in governance archive
Future generations can see complete governance evolution.
π Complete Reference
Rank & Voting Summary
π± Seeker
1A
10
1.00Γ
N/A
Cannot vote
πΏ Apprentice
1B
15
1.00Γ
N/A
Cannot vote
π§ Contributor
2
20
1.02Γ
10%
Small proposals
βοΈ Operator
3A
30
1.05Γ
10%
Mid proposals in lane
π― Specialist
3B
35
1.05Γ
10%
Mid proposals in lane
π· Crew Lead
4
40
1.08Γ
10%
Small-mid proposals
π Project Lead
5
50
1.10Γ
15%
Mid proposals
π§ Guide
6
60
1.12Γ
20%
High-scope proposals
ποΈ Community Lead
7
70
1.15Γ
20%
High-scope proposals
β Anchor
8A
80
1.18Γ
20%
Unrestricted
π₯οΈ Platform Lead
8B
82
1.18Γ
20%
Unrestricted
π‘οΈ Guardian
9A
90
1.22Γ
20%
Unrestricted
π Strategist
9B
91
1.22Γ
20%
Unrestricted
βοΈ Steward
10
92
1.25Γ
20%
Unrestricted
Proposal Thresholds
βοΈ Operational
>50%
10%
48h
$10K
π° Financial
>60%
15%
72h
10% treasury
ποΈ Governance
>65%
20%
7d
N/A
Safety Rails
π Per-Proposal
10%
Single proposal limit
π Daily
5%
Daily extraction limit
π Monthly
20%
Monthly extraction limit
π Reserve Floor
15%
Minimum always held
Council Composition
Size
3-7 members
Eligibility
Level 8+ with 12+ month tenure
Term
12 months
Term Limit
3 consecutive (can run again after gap)
Election
Ranked choice by all L2+ members
Quorum
Majority (supermajority for veto)
Amendment Requirements
Constitutional
>65%
30%
14d
2 weeks
Policy
>65%
20%
7d
Concurrent
β Charter FAQ
Q: What if governance is compromised?
A: Multiple safeguards:
Safety rails cannot be bypassed (hardcoded)
Leadership Council can emergency veto
Immutable values locked in code
Community can override Council (75% vote)
Constitutional amendments require 30% quorum
Q: Can the 4Γ power ceiling be removed?
A: No. The ceiling is constitutional (immutable in smart contracts). Removing it requires an immutable code change, which requires a hard forkβa community decision to literally change the software layer. This is theoretically possible but extremely difficult and transparent.
Q: What happens if the Leadership Council abuses power?
A: Multiple remedies:
Community can override vetoes (75% vote)
Members can recall Council members (>65% vote)
Council decisions are on-chain and auditable
Emergency veto has strict timeline (48h window)
Abuse triggers governance investigation
Q: How does this prevent whale attacks?
A: Quadratic voting + 4Γ ceiling:
1 whale with 100,000 EQTBLT: ~31,623 power (capped at 4Γ base)
100 members with 1,000 EQTBLT each: 3,162 Γ 100 = 316,200 power
100 members collectively > 1 whale (10Γ stronger)
Q: Who enforces the charter?
A: The smart contracts enforce rules automatically. No human intervention is needed for:
Vote counting
Quorum verification
Threshold checking
Safety rail enforcement
Timelock execution
Leadership Council provides additional human judgment for edge cases.
Q: Can investors buy governance control?
A: No. Investors can only get voting power through:
Earning EQTBLT (via contribution, housing payments)
Receiving investor multiplier on their EQTBLT holdings
An investor with $100M and zero EQTBLT has zero voting power. BLTBY tokens do not provide voting power.
Q: What is the DAO responsible for?
A: Built By DAO is responsible for:
π Developing housing and community spaces
π° Managing treasury responsibly
π³οΈ Operating fair governance
βοΈ Following legal requirements
π Maintaining financial records
Members are responsible for:
π¨ Doing good work
π³οΈ Participating in governance
π Honest disclosure
π€ Good faith cooperation
Q: How do members leave?
A: Members can:
Resign membership (loses voting power, access)
Keep EQTBLT for redemption/equity use
Transfer property rights if applicable
Full procedures in membership operating agreement
β οΈ Charter as Law
This charter represents the foundational governing rules of Built By DAO. It is:
β Enforced by smart contracts (cannot be overridden)
β Legally binding under Wyoming DAO LLC operating agreement
β Amended only through formal governance process
β The source of all authority within the DAO
Any activity in violation of this charter is void and may result in member removal.
No verbal claim, email, or outside authority supersedes these written rules.
π Voting Details
Voting Power β Full voting formula
π Proposals
Proposal System β How to submit
π Proposal Types
Proposal Types β Thresholds
π° Treasury
Treasury Management β Fund operations
π‘οΈ Safety Rails
Safety Rails β Financial protections
ποΈ Leadership Council
Leadership Council β Council structure
π¨ Veto Powers
Veto Powers β Emergency vetoes
π Process
How Governance Works β Full workflow
βοΈ Compliance
Compliance β Legal requirements
π Ethics
Ethics β Behavioral standards
π Related Pages
Voting PowerProposalsProposal TypesTreasurySafety RailsLeadership CouncilVeto PowersHow Governance WorksComplianceEthicsMember LevelsEQTBLT TokenBLTBY TokenLast updated